Recorded example · real WebSecure scanner · 19 Nov 2026 · test page made by HoopGram
What happens when you scan a site
A recorded scan of a HoopGram test page, step by step: what we looked at, what we found, and how you can check it yourself.
In one minute
- What did you check?
- One public page, scan.hoopgram.com/example/shop. 26 checks on what any browser receives: the connection and certificate, security headers, cookies, the page's own scripts and public DNS records. No login, no attack traffic.
- What did you find?
- Two real problems, both planted on purpose: an old jQuery with a bug that attackers are using, and a cookie sent without
Secure. Plus one note for information. - How can I verify it?
- Open the test page and both reports below. Every finding shows what we saw, and every software verdict links to its public source.
- What if you keep watching?
- Protect, $9 per site a month: a check every day, an email only when something new needs you, and an email when we confirm a fix.
The scan, step by step
-
You enter an addressYou
Uses: the address only. No account, no card.
In this scan:
https://scan.hoopgram.com/example/shop, entered at 05:38:46 UTC. -
We connectAutomatic
Uses: DNS, the HTTPS response and the certificate. Private and internal addresses are refused, again on every redirect.
In this scan: HTTPS with TLS 1.3, a valid Let's Encrypt certificate with 89 days left, and old TLS 1.0 and 1.1 refused.
-
Public checksAutomatic
Uses: only what any visitor's browser receives: response headers, cookies, the page and up to 12 of its own scripts, and public DNS records.
In this scan: 26 checks, 11 requests, about one second. 22 passed, 3 found something, 1 could not run. Deep checks for exposed files and admin pages need a verified domain, so they show as "could not run", never as passed.
-
Known-bug matchingAutomatic, only when a version is visible
Uses: OSV.dev for known bugs in a package version, CISA's list of bugs attackers are using now, and endoflife.date for whether a version still gets security fixes.
A version we could see:
Seen in the page's scriptsjQuery 1.12.4OSV.dev4 known bugsOne of themCVE-2020-11023CISA's listExploited, listed 23 Jan 2025A version we could not see:
Server headernginxVersionHiddenResultNot matchedWhen a version is hidden we say "not matched", never "safe". A match means this version contains the bug. It does not mean the site was hacked.
Separate and optional: your
package-lock.json. A URL scan only sees what the browser downloads, not the packages on your server. You can send the lockfile through the API or your coding agent, and we check every package the same way. -
The reportAutomatic
Uses: the results above. An AI writes the explanations, but it cannot add findings. The checks are fixed code, so the same site gives the same result twice.
In this scan: the verdict, two problems with evidence and fixes, the software list and every check, ready 19 seconds after the address was entered.
Not safe: fix nowAn attacker could use the jQuery bug today. That is why one finding is enough for this verdict.
One finding, before and after
The cookie problem is the easiest one to see for yourself. Without Secure, a browser can send the cookie over plain http://. Someone on the same public Wi-Fi could read it, and if it were a real login cookie, act as you. It is a medium problem, not a break-in on its own.
Before · problem found · medium
Scan s_kD3UuN5obbYI, 05:38 UTC
GET https://scan.hoopgram.com/example/shop Set-Cookie: demo_session=…; Path=/example; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax
After · same page, same check · passed
Rescan s_C2sP7hvJoCbB, 05:39 UTC
GET https://scan.hoopgram.com/example/shop Set-Cookie: demo_session=…; Path=/example; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax; Secure
The scanner hides cookie values (…) in every report. This one holds no data anyway.
The fix we deployed
The report's suggested fix: set Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax on session cookies. On the test page that was a one-word change, deployed at 05:39 UTC:
- Set-Cookie: demo_session=…; Path=/example; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax + Set-Cookie: demo_session=…; Path=/example; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax; Secure
The rescan of the same page then reported: Fixed (1) the cookie, Still open (2) jQuery and the mail note. We left jQuery old on purpose, so you can scan the page and see that finding yourself.
Check it yourself
- Open the test page. In your browser's developer tools, open the Network tab, reload, and read the
Set-Cookieline. - Scan the test page now. You will get the jQuery finding and a passing cookie check.
- Look up the jQuery bug at OSV.dev ↗ and on CISA's list ↗.
When we cannot confirm a fix
Right after the fix, we scanned a different page on the same site, https://scan.hoopgram.com/. That page sets no cookie at all, so the cookie problem was simply not there. A careless comparison would call it fixed. Ours doesn't:
From scan s_TVcsBJsmfJap, 05:39 UTC. Only the rescan of the same page, above, could call the cookie fixed.
Where the free scan ends
The scan is done when the report is ready. Everything after that is your choice, and each choice is separate.
- Fix it
- You, your developer, or your coding agent. Each report has a "Copy fix prompt" button for Claude Code, Cursor or Codex.
- Rescan
- Free. Same page, same checks. Only then do we call something fixed.
- Keep watching
- Protect, $9 per site a month. A check every day, and the same day CISA adds a bug attackers are using. Your software list rechecked against OSV.dev, CISA and endoflife.date. An email only when something new needs you, and an email when we confirm a fix. A weekly deep scan once your domain is verified, with the verification kept fresh for you. Cancel any time. See plans
What no URL scan can see: pages behind a login, who can read whose data in your app, and code that never reaches the browser. Those need a different kind of review.